Abstract. Yeh et al. have recently proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard. They claim their protocol is secure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward secrecy. In this paper we show that the proposed protocol does not have cited security features properly. A powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol whereby the whole security of the protocol is broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al.'s protocol does not assure the untraceabilitiy and backward untraceabilitiy attributes. We also will propose our revision to safeguard the Yeh et al.'s protocol against cited attacks.
Introduction
Nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been incorporated in our daily life and employed in many applications e.g. public transportation passes [1] , supply chain management [2] , e-passport [3] etc. RFID systems include tags, readers and back-end server. The tag is a low cost device with a constraint microchip, small memory and antenna to communicate with the reader. The readers are placed between tags and back-end server as an intermediary for message transmission. Not surprisingly, the back-end server has the whole information and secret values of all tags.
EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard is a framework for RFID communications, defined by EPC global (Electronic Product Code) organization [4, 5] but RFID authentication protocols based on it have undergone noticeable difficulties to satisfy the perfect security characteristics.
In order to have secure authentication protocols, an adversary should not be able to obtain any information about the target tag. Privacy and untraceability are two important issues relevant to RFID systems. Thus, an authentication protocol should assure the privacy characteristics including untraceability and backward untraceability for tags and their holders [6] . On the other side, RFID authentication protocols are under different threats, defined as follows.
Information leakage: the tag and reader perform an authentication protocol and exchange some messages with each other. Since the wireless communication channel is insecure, it can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Hence, each authentication protocol should be designed in a way that the adversary, with reasonable computational capabilities, does not be able to exploit the exchanged messages [7] .
Tag Tracing and tracking: Tag tracing and tracking are damaging problems in RFID systems. Even when the leakage of information is impossible, the untraceability of tag and its holder is not guaranteed in RFID systems. Untraceability means that if an adversary eavesdrops message transmission between a target tag and a reader at time t, he does not be able to distinguish an interaction of that tag at time t' t [8] .
DoS attack: denial-of-Service (DoS) is another attack on RFID systems. An adversary tries to find ways to fail target tag from receiving services, e.g. in the desynchronization attack, as one kind of DoS attacks, the shared secret value between the tag and the back-end server is made inconsistent by an adversary. Then, the tag and back-end server cannot recognize each other in future and tag becomes disabled [9] .
Many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Although these protocols tried to provide secure and untraceable communication for RFID systems, however many weaknesses have been found in them [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21] . In this context, Yeh et al. have recently proposed a RFID mutual authentication protocol compatible with EPC C-1 G-2 standard [22] that we name SRP (Securing RFID Protocol) in this paper. The authors have claimed that not only SRP does not reveal any information but also it has forward secrecy and robustness against DoS attack. In this paper, we prove that SRP is vulnerable to a powerful and fatal attack that needs only 2 16 off-line PRNG (pseudo random number generator) computations. Furthermore, the whole security of this protocol will be destroyed inasmuch as the RFID system is most vulnerable to tag and reader impersonation, DoS attack, untraceability and backward untraceability. Finally we propose our revision to prevent the mentioned attacks.
Review SRP

Initialization phase
The nine secret values , , , , , , EP , RID and DATA corresponding to each tag is loaded in database. Besides, random values , and are generated by manufacturer and the recorded values are set in a way that = = , = = and = = . Each tag records four values = , = , = and EP .
The (i+1)th Authentication Round
In this part, the SRP protocol is briefly described. The following steps explain the protocol in the round (i+1). Receives ( , M1, D, E, V ), the database performs the following procedure: a) For each stored RID, computes H(RID⨁ ) and compares it with V to find whether the computed value is equal to V. If it is true, the database will authenticate the reader. b) Based on value , one of the two following procedures is occurred: i.
The database computes PRNG (EP ⨁ ), =M1⨁ and =M1⨁
provided that = 0, because it means the first access. Then it checks whether or correspond to PRNG(EP ⨁ ). This process is regularly repeated until a match equality is founded. X is set to either old or new provided that either or is the match, respectively. ii.
If 0, the database uses as an index to find the corresponding recorded entry. When the database finds an entry correspondent to , then the value of X is determined either old or new provided that or respectively. Corresponding and EP are extracted to check whether PRNG(EP ⨁ )⨁ is equal to M1 or not. The database obtains with the aid of K X and D, and ensures whether ⨁PRNG( ⨁ ) is equal to the received E. and sends M2 to the tag. The tag picks up the stored and computes ⨁M2 to find whether it is equal to PRNG(EP ⨁ ). If the matching is found, the database is authenticated and the tag updates as follows:
Vulnerabilities of SRP
In this section we show the vulnerabilities of SRP. First a practical and powerful attack on SRP is presented. Then, we show that an adversary obtains the most important secret value of a tag which called EP , and show that SRP is vulnerable to tracing attacks. Hence, we show that the SRP does not provide backward untraceability and untraceability.
Reveal EP
Since and are XORed with EP , we can conclude the and bit lengths are the same as EP bit length. Furthermore, , and bit length must be equal to the PRNG bit length inasmuch as they are updated by PRNG. Due to the fact that the EP bit length is very short and fix in all rounds of the SRP, an adversary can exploit this subject to get EP . He just needs to perform two consecutive sessions with the target tag and calculate off-line PRNG computations. The procedure of our attack is explained as follows. 1. The adversary starts a session with the target tag T i in the round (i+1) by sending random number and T i replies with ( , M , ). The adversary reserves M and terminates the session. He performs the second session with T i by transmission of and gets tag's response as ( , M , , ). 2. Since the first session is not completed, T i does not update its secret key for the second session. Hence M and M are constructed as follows: After at most execution of the algorithm, the adversary finds the correct EP . As a result of the above attack, we present three noticeable attacks on SRP including tag impersonation, reader impersonation and DoS attack.
Tag Impersonation
An adversary simply gets the secret key by a passive attack. Indeed, he listens to the communication channel between the legitimate reader R and the target tag T i in the round (i+1) to obtain and ( , M , , ). Since the adversary has EP , he computes PRNG (EP ⨁ ). Thus the secret key is computed as: =M ⨁(EP ⨁ ) and =PRNG( ). The random number is computed as: =D⨁ and finally the index for the next session is computed as =PRNG( ⨁ ). Now, the adversary starts a new session with the reader. R sends to him and he replies ( , M , , ) where M =PRNG(EP ⨁ )⨁ , = ⨁ and = ⨁PRN( ⨁ ). Since these values are correctly computed, the database accepts the adversary and authenticates him.
Reader Impersonation and DoS Attack
SRP is also vulnerable by two other attacks. By revealing EP , the adversary can forge a legitimate reader and then desynchronize the target tag. The procedure of these attacks is explained as follows. 
Privacy Analysis
The authors of SRP have specified that not only their protocol have forward secrecy, but also SRP is resistant to the tracing attacks. We show that SRP does not have forward secrecy and we also present a traceability attack on SRP.
Privacy Model
There are privacy models for the evaluation of RFID protocols [6, 23, 24, 25, 26] . We analyze SRP protocol based on Ouafi and Phan model [26] which is based on [24] and [6] . The model is summarized as follows.
The protocol parties are tags (T) and readers (R) which interact in protocol sessions. In this model an adversary A controls the communication channel between all parties by interacting either passively or actively with them. The adversary A is allowed to run the following queries:  Execute (R, T, i ) query. This query models the passive attacks. The adversary A eavesdrops on the communication channel between T and R and gets read access to the exchanged messages between the parties in session i of a truthful protocol execution.  Send (U, V, m, i ) query. This query models active attacks by allowing the adversary A to impersonate some reader U R (respectively tag V T ) in some protocol session i and send a message m of its choice to an instance of some tag V T (respectively reader U R ). Furthermore the adversary A is allowed to block or alert the message m that is sent from U to V (respectively V to U) in session i of a truthful protocol execution.  Corrupt (T, ) query. This query allows the adversary A to learn the stored secret K of the tag T T, and which further sets the stored secret to . Corrupt query means that the adversary has physical access to the tag, i.e. the adversary can read and tamper with the tag's permanent memory.
 Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. This query does not correspond to any of A's abilities, but it is necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for session i, a random bit b {0, 1} is generated and then, A is given T b {T o , T 1 ).
Informally, A wins if he can guess the bit b.
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game g played between an adversary A and a collection of the reader and the tag instances. The game g is divided into three following phases:  Learning phase: A is given tags T o and T 1 randomly and he is able to send any Execute, Send and Corrupt queries of its choice to T 0 , T 1 and reader.  Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T 0 , T 1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, T o , T 1 ) query. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b {0, 1}, A is given a tag T b from the set {T 0 , T 1 }.A continues making any Execute, and Send queries at will.  Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b' {0, 1}, which is its guess of the value of b. The success of A in winning game g and thus breaking the notion of UPriv is quantified in terms A advantage in distinguishing whether A received T 0 or T 1 and denoted by (k) where k is the security parameter. Besides, the notion backward untraceability is defined as: "backward untraceability states that even if given all the internal states of a target tag at time t, the adversary shouldn't be able to identify the target tag's interactions that occur at time t' < t" [6] .
Backward traceability
In this section we show how to break the notion backward untraceability in the SRP protocol. Because EP is constant in the all rounds of SRP, an adversary A can track the target tag with doing the following steps:  Learning phase: A sends a Corrupt (T 0 , ) query in the round (i+1) and obtains ( ).  Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags (T 0 , T 1 ) to be tested and sends a Test 
Hence we have:
By the fact that EP is a permanent value in the all rounds of the protocol, we have = .
Thus we have the following procedure: 
Traceability attack
An authentication protocol for RFID systems should assure the privacy of a tag and its holder. However, many RFID protocols put it at risk by designing protocols where tags answer reader's queries with permanent values. Thus performing traceability attacks not only possible but trivial. Now, we prove the SRP does not guarantee privacy location and allows tags tracking.  Learning phase: A sends an Execute (R, T 0 , i+1) query in the (i+1)th round by sending N R1 and obtains ( ).  Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags (T 0 , T 1 ) to be tested and sends a Test 
Note that T 0 does not update its secrets in the Learning phase and uses the same secret key in both Learning and Challenge phase. Now we have the following result:

Revised Protocol
In order to eliminate the mentioned vulnerabilities in 3.1 and 3.2 subsections, we can modify the message M1 as: M1=PRNG(EP ⨁ ⨁ )⨁ . Although the cited vulnerabilities are fixed by the above modification, the traceability problem still will be unsolved. Hence, we need to construct the message M1 as following: M1=PRNG(EP ⨁ ⨁ T)⨁ to provide a secure protocol against all cited attacks.
Security analysis
Now, we analyze the security of the revised protocol as following. Untraceability: Due to the fact that N T is a random and fresh value, the tag's responses are different whenever an adversary sends query and therefore, the adversary is unable to trace a tag.
Backward untraceability: If an adversary knows EPC s and N R in worth case, he cannot recognize any previous interactions by a tag inasmuch as he does not know N T .
Reveal EPC s : Since EPC s is constant and its length is short, the mentioned attacks in 3.1 subsection happened successfully. We have added the random and fresh value N T in construction of M1 to remove these flaws. As a result, when an adversary wants to reveal EPC s , he has to perform 2 48 calculations rather than 2 16 .It is a noticeable improvement in SRP security.
Conclusion
In this paper, the significant security flaws in the Yeh et al. mutual authentication protocol were showed. We presented a powerful and practical attack on SRP which reveals the permanent secret value of the target tag. This attack leads to tag and reader impersonation and desynchronization attack on the protocol. Moreover, we proved that this protocol did not provide untraceability and backward untraceability. Our privacy analysis has been presented in a formal privacy model. Finally, to eliminate all cited vulnerabilities, we revised the SRP protocol and constructed the message M1 in a new way.
